Traceable Alias Protocol based on Implicit Certificate

Abstract

With the rapid development of the Internet, its anonymity and freedom have fostered the diversification of online applications in services and industry development, allowing users to access a wealth of convenient information easily. However, this has also led to numerous improper online behaviors, including crimes committed through hiding and falsifying identities. Implementing an online real-name system to prevent the hiding and falsification of identities is an important aspect of safety and the verification of true identities. Yet, this system faces controversies regarding the culture of online anonymity and individual privacy rights. To balance safety and convenience, this study is based on Rabadi's concept of implicit certificates, proposing a "Traceable Anonymity Certificate Application Protocol." By integrating certificate and digital signature mechanisms, this protocol aims to find a middle ground between real-name and anonymity systems. Besides standardizing identity verification behaviors and raising the threshold for identity impersonation, it also allows for the concealment of users' real identities to achieve anonymity. In case of disputes, users' identity information can be verified through specific methods, such as comparing the digital signature with the one stored in the certificate authority's database or using a secure hash function to verify the certificate's integrity.